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Abstract 
Optimal production decisions depend on local market characteristics. This paper develops a 
model to explain firm labor demand and firm density across regions. Firms vary in their 
technology to combine imperfectly substitutable worker types, and locate across regions with 
distinct distributions of workers and wages. Firm technologies which best match regional 
labor markets explain both productivity differences and firm density. Estimating structural 
model parameters is simple and relies on a two stage OLS procedure. The first stage 
estimates local market conditions using firm employment and regional data, while the second 
incorporates regional costs into production function estimation. The method is applied to 
Chinese manufacturing, population census and geographic data to estimate local market costs 
and production technologies. In line with the model, we find that labor markets which 
provide cost advantages explain substantial differences in firm productivity. Furthermore, 
regions which have lower optimal hiring costs attract more firms per capita. 
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1 Introduction
A number of studies document large and persistent differences in productivity across both
countries and firms.1 However, these differences remain largely ‘some sort of measure of our
ignorance’ (Abramovitz, 1956). This paper inquires to what extent the supply characteristics
of regional input markets might help explain such systematic productivity dispersion across
firms. It would be surprising if disparate factor markets result in similar outcomes, when
clearly the prices and quality of inputs available vary considerably over space. Modeling
firm adaptation to different factor markets provides deeper insights and testable predictions
about how firms produce and where they choose to locate.
Differences between factor markets, especially for labor, are likely to be especially stark
in developing economies undergoing urbanization (Lewis, 1954), or when government poli-
cies increase relocation costs beyond those normally present. Institutional mobility con-
straints, such as the hukou system in China, further exacerbate differences in the compo-
sition of labor markets. Even the US labor market, which is considered relatively fluid,
exhibits high migration costs as measured by the wage differential required to drive reloca-
tion (Kennan and Walker, 2011). Thus, free movement of factors does not mean frictionless
movement, and recent work has indicated imperfect factor mobility has sizable economic
effects (Topalova, 2010). Rather than considering the forces which cause workers to locate
across space, this paper instead takes a different turn to inquire what existing differences in
regional input markets imply for firm input use, location and productivity.
To better understand these issues, we propose a multi-region, multi-industry general equi-
librium model. Industries vary in team technology, i.e. their ability to substitute between
different types of labor (e.g. Bowles, 1970). Each region is endowed with a different dis-
tribution of skill types and wages across workers. Firms freely locate and hire a team of
workers by choosing the optimal combination of skill levels given local conditions. Since
firms take regional characteristics as given, each firm chooses an optimal labor force con-
ditional on industry technology and locality. It follows that the comparative suitability of
regions varies by industry. Firms thus locate in proportion to the cost advantages available
in each region.
In the model, firm hiring depends on the local distribution of worker types and wages.
Since labor demand depends on model parameters and regional labor market conditions,
this implies real labor costs vary by region and industry. These labor costs help explain
1See Syverson (2011) for a review.
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differences in productivity.2 However, it is not immediately clear that such productivity dif-
ferences are of an economically large magnitude. To quantify real world supply conditions,
we develop an estimation strategy for the key structural parameters. A simple relationship
obtains between the firm-level shares of worker types hired and regional observables, which
can be estimated by OLS as a first stage. The first stage identifies the labor technology pa-
rameters and allows computation of regional labor costs by industry, linking regional markets
to productivity. Furthermore, the model relaxes the often imposed restriction that production
be supermodular, a restriction that would otherwise often bind in our sample. The second
stage incorporates regional costs into production function estimation, either by OLS or other
commonly used methods. This strategy is straightforward to implement, and simulation of
the underlying production model shows little accuracy is lost in comparison to full structural
estimation.
The procedure just outlined is applied to manufacturing and population census data
spread over three hundred prefectures in China. The manufacturing survey reports the distri-
bution of workers across skills for each firm, while the population census provides regional
distributions of wages and worker skill types. By revealing how firm demand for skills varies
with local conditions, this information allows recovery of the unit costs for labor across
China. Our estimates imply an interquartile difference in labor costs of 30 to 80 percent. As
predicted by the model, labor costs are negatively related to the value added per capita across
regions. This indicates that economic activity locates where regional costs are lowest.
A second stage estimates production function parameters, explicitly accounting for re-
gional cost differences. Since firms are capable of substituting out of labor inputs when they
are relatively expensive, this fact alters estimation of the relative share of labor in production.
Once this effect is accounted for, labor cost differences result in firm productivity differences
of 3 to 17 percent. The estimates show that favorable labor market conditions explain sub-
stantial differences in firm productivity. Once local market costs are controlled for, ‘residual’
productivity is a stronger predictor of firm performance characteristics such as survival and
growth. This suggests that the unobservables which make firms more competitive are often
conflated with advantageous input markets.
Related work. The importance of local market characteristics, especially in developing
countries, has recently been emphasized by Karadi and Koren (2012). These authors cali-
brate a spatial firm model to sector level data in developing countries to better account for
the role of firm location in measured productivity. Moretti (2011) reviews work on local
2Effective labor costs are driven by the complementarity of regional endowments with industry technology,
and the paper refers to these additional real production possibilities as ‘productivity’.
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labor markets and agglomeration economies, explicitly modeling spatial equilibrium across
labor markets. Distinct from this literature, we take the outcome of spatial labor markets
as given and focus on the trade offs firms face and the consequences of regional markets in
productivity measurement and firm location.
Several papers have explored how different aspects of labor affect firm-level productivity.
There is substantial work on the effect of worker skills on productivity (Abowd Kramarz and
Margolis (1999, 2005), Fox and Smeets (2011)).3,4 In contrast, this paper considers the role
of differences in input markets across regions.
Within the trade literature, a few studies propose that different industries perform opti-
mally under different degrees of skill diversity. Based on this idea, Grossman and Maggi
(2000) build a theoretical model explaining how differences in skill dispersion across coun-
tries could determine comparative advantage and global trade patterns. Building on this
work, Morrow (2010) proposes a multi-industry model of firms which allows for technol-
ogy choice and general skill distributions to estimate the model across developing countries,
finding that skill diversity is significant in explaining productivity and export differences.
Although we are unaware of other studies estimating model primitives as a function of
local market characteristics, reduced form empirical work is consonant with the theoretical
implications. Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008) find that higher skill dispersion is asso-
ciated with higher TFP in Italy. Similarly, Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2011) find that
diversity in education leads to higher productivity in Denmark. Martins (2008) finds that
firm wage dispersion affects firm performance in Portugal. Bombardini, Gallipoli, and Pu-
pato (2011) use literacy scores to show that countries with more dispersed skills specialize
in industries characterized by lower skill complementarity. In contrast, this paper combines
firm and population census data to explicitly model regional differences in input markets,
leading to micro founded identification and estimates. The method used is novel, and re-
sults of this paper highlight the degree to which firm behavior are influenced by economic
geography through the availability of inputs.5
Clearly this study also contributes to the empirical literature on Chinese productivity.
Ma, Tang, and Zhang (2011) show that exporting is positively correlated with TFP and that
3Other labor characteristics that drive productivity include managerial talent and practices (Bloom and
Reenen, 2007), social connections among workers (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2009), organizational form
(Garicano and Heaton, 2010) and incentive pay (Lazear, 2000).
4Other determinants of firm productivity include market structure (Syverson (2004)), product market rivalry
and technology spillovers (Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2007)) and vertical integration (Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2007), Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012)).
5The importance of backward linkages for firm behavior are a recurring theme in both the development and
economic geography literature, see Hirschman (1958) and recently Overman and Puga (2010).
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firms self select into exporting which, ex post, further increases TFP. Brandt et al. (2009)
estimate Chinese firm TFP, showing that new entry accounts for two thirds of TFP growth
and that TFP growth dominates input accumulation as a source of output growth. Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) posit that India and China have lower productivity relative to the US due
to resource misallocation and compute how manufacturing TFP in India and China would
increase if resource allocation was similar to that of the US. This paper uncovers local factors
that determine productivity. How this interacts with the above mechanisms is a potential area
for further work.6
The rest of the paper continues by laying out a model that incorporates a rich view of the
labor hiring process. The model explains how firms internalize local labor market conditions
to maximize profits, resulting in an industry specific unit cost of labor by region. Section 3
places these firms in a general equilibrium, monopolistic competition framework, in partic-
ular addressing where firms locate. Section 4 explains how the model can be estimated with
a simple nested OLS approach, and is illustrated using a simulated data set generated by the
model. Section 5 discusses details of the data, while Section 6 presents our model estimates
and uses them to explain the effect of different regional input markets on firm behavior.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Role of Skill Mix in Production
The primary goal of this section is to develop a model of firm hiring which takes into account
both the wages and quantity of locally available worker types. Recently, both Borjas (2009)
and Ottaviano and Peri (2010) have emphasized the importance of more complete model
frameworks to estimate substitution between worker types. However, in distinction to most
of the labor literature, our primary interest is firm behavior and accordingly we develop a
model that predicts hiring by firms rather than wages to estimate substitution patterns.
The model specifies a theory of the firm which begins with a neoclassical production
function combining homogeneous inputs (materials, capital) and differentiated inputs (types
of labor). While homogeneous inputs are perfectly mobile within industries, labor is per-
fectly mobile within regions. Industries are assumed to have different technologies available
for combining types of labor into teams. Since workers are imperfectly substitutable, they
potentially induce spillovers within firms, a distinct possibility allowed for by our model, and
6Such regional differences might help explain the Chinese export facts of Manova and Zhang (2012) and
the different impact of liberalization across trade regimes found by Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2012).
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consequently are not paid their marginal product.7 We proceed with a detailed specification
of the labor hiring process, solving for firms’ optimal responses to prevailing labor market
supply conditions. This provides a characterization of the unit cost for labor by region which
depends on local conditions and firm technology. This induces comparative advantage across
regions for any given technology, and thereby helps explain productivity differences in terms
of local input markets.
2.1 Firm Production
Firm j within an industry T faces a neoclassical production technology FTj (M,K,L) which
combines materials M, capital K and labor L to produce output. While M and K are com-
posed of homogeneous units measured by value, labor is composed of a heterogeneous team
of workers who provide an aggregate vector of human capital H. An industry specific capital
stock KT is mobile within each industry, and in equilibrium is available at rental rate rTK .
Similarly, an industry specific stock of materials MT is mobile and available at a price rTM.
Labor is intersectorally mobile but interregionally immobile, and consists of S skill types
of workers, indexed i ∈ {1, . . . ,S}, who are combined to provide effective labor L. The
amount of L produced by the firm depends on the composition of a team through a techno-
logical parameter θT in the following way:
L≡
(
Hθ
T
1 +H
θT
2 + . . .+H
θT
S
)1/θT
. (2.1)
Notice that in the case of θT = 1, this specification collapses to a model where L is the to-
tal level of human capital HTOT = ∑i Hi. More generally, the Marginal Rate of Technical
Substitution of type i for type i′ is (Hi/Hi′)
θT−1. θT < 1 implies worker types are comple-
mentary, so that the firm’s ideal workforce tends to represent a mix of all types (Figure 2.1a).
In contrast, for θT > 1, firms are more dependent on singular sources of human capital as
L becomes submodular, i.e. convex in the input of each single type (Figure 2.1b).8 We will
specify a hiring process so that despite the convexity inherent in Figure 2.1b, once firms
choose the quality of their workers through hiring standards h, the labor isoquants resume
their typical shapes as in Figure 2.2. This avoids the possibility that some worker types are
never hired, in line with expectations about real world data patterns.
7Such spillovers are internalized by firms in the model. The extent to which spillovers might also occur
across industries is beyond the scope of this study, however see Moretti (2004) for evidence in the US context.
8See Morrow (2010) for a more detailed interpretation of super- and sub-modularity and implications.
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Figure 2.1: Human Capital Isoquants
(a) Supermodular Production in H Space (b) Submodular Production in H Space
Rewriting Equation (2.1) in terms of human capital shares within the firm shows the labor
provided per unit of human capital is
L/HTOT =
(
(H1/HTOT)
θT +(H2/HTOT)
θT + . . .+(HS/HTOT)
θT
)1/θT
.
Writing the shares of human capital across types of workers as H˜ ≡ (H1/HTOT, . . . ,HS/HTOT) ,
effective labor can be written
L︸︷︷︸
Effective Labor
= φ
(
H˜,θT
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Team Productivity Effect
· HTOT︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Human Capital
where φ
(
x,θT
)≡ (∑i xθTi )1/θT so that the output is given by FT (M,K,φ (H˜,θT) ·HTOT).
Although the technology θT is the same for all firms in an industry, firms do not all face
the same regional factor markets. Explicitly modeling these disparate markets emphasizes
the role of regional heterogeneity in supplying human capital inputs to the firm in terms
of both price and quality. This provides not only differences in productivity across regions
by technology, but since industries differ in technology, local market conditions are more or
less amenable to particular industries. We now detail the hiring process, introducing different
markets and deriving firms’ optimal hiring to best accommodate these differences.
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2.2 Optimal Hiring by Region and Technology
In each region R, workers command region specific wages for each type of labor wR =(
wR,1, . . . ,wR,S
)
and have type-industry specific human capital mT =
(
mT1 , . . . ,m
T
S
)
. In order
to hire workers, a firm must pay a fixed search cost of f effective labor units, at which point
a distribution of worker types with regional frequencies aR =
(
aR,1, . . . ,aR,S
)
are available
from the search process.9 Each worker has a firm specific match quality h ∼ Ψ which is
observed during search and the firm hires on the basis of match quality. Consequently,
the firm chooses a minimum threshold of match quality for each type they will retain, h =
(h1, . . . ,hS).
10 Upon keeping a preferred set of workers, the firm may repeat this process N
times until achieving their desired workforce. At the end of hiring, the amount of human
capital produced by each type i is given by
Hi ≡ N ·aR,imTi
∫ ∞
hi
hdΨ. (2.2)
From a firm’s perspective, the threshold of worker match quality h is a means to choose an
optimal level of H, holding N fixed. However, as a firm lowers its quality threshold, it faces
an increasing average cost of each type of human capital Hi . These increasing average costs
induce the firm to maintain a positive match quality threshold and to search repeatedly for
suitable workers.
The total costs of hiring labor depend on the regional wage rates wR, the availability of
workers aR, and the unit cost of labor in region R using technology T , labeled cTR . Since the
total number of each type i hired is NaR,i (1−Ψ(hi)), the total hiring bill is
Total Hiring Costs : N
[
∑
i
wR,iaR,i (1−Ψ(hi))+ f cTR
]
. (2.3)
Clearly, the firm faces a trade-off between the quantity and quality of workers hired. For
instance, the firm might hire a large number of workers and “cherry pick” the best matches
by choosing high values for h or save on interviewing costs f by choosing a low number
of prospectives N and permissively low values for h. This trade off and its dependence
9The weights aR can capture both the frequencies of available workers in addition to the possibility that
certain types of workers may be more difficult to hire for a particular task.
10This assumption is familiar from labor search models. We do not explicitly model equilibrium unemploy-
ment due to the lack of a simple form for cross regional empirical work (see Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding
(2010)). Unlikely Helpman, et al. differences in hiring patterns across firms within the same industry are
determined by regional market conditions, rather than a productivity draw.
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on the regional labor supply characteristics aR and wR is made explicit by considering the
technology and region specific cost function CT (H|aR,wR), defined by
CT ≡min
N,h
N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,i (1−Ψ(hi))+ f cTR
]
where Hi ≤ NaR,imTi
∫ ∞
hi
hdΨ. (2.4)
Letting µi denote the Lagrange multiplier for each of the S cost minimization constraints,
the first order conditions for {hi} imply µi = wR,i/mTi hi, while the condition for N implies
CT (H|aR,wR) =∑
i
µiHi =∑wR,iHi/mTi hi. (2.5)
Equation (2.5) shows that the multipliers µi are the marginal cost contribution (per skill unit)
to Hi of the last type i worker hired.
The trade off between being more selective (high h) and avoiding search costs ( f cTR) is
clearly illustrated by combining Equations (2.3) and (2.5), which shows:
∑
i
aR,iwR,i
∫ ∞
hi
(h−hi)/hidΨ= f cTR . (2.6)
The LHS of Equation (2.6) decreases in h, so when a firm faces lower interviewing costs
it can afford to be more selective by increasing h. Conversely, in the presence of high in-
terviewing costs, the firm optimally “lowers their standards” h to increase the size of their
workforce without interviewing additional workers.
2.3 Cost Minimization
For a firm j to produce Q j units of output at minimal cost, inputs are chosen to solve
min
K,M,H
CT (H|aR,wR)+ rTKK+ rTMM subject to FTj
(
M,K,φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT)≥ Q j. (2.7)
The first order conditions for HTOT and Hi immediately imply that(
wR,iHi/mTi hi
)
/CT (H|aR,wR) = d lnL/d lnHi =
(
H˜i+d lnφ
(
H˜,θT
)
/d lnHi
)
. (2.8)
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This fixes a key relationship about the wage premium, defined as the share of wages paid to
a type beyond the share of human capital contributed. From (2.8), let
w˜TR,i ≡
(
wR,iHi/mTi hi
)
/CT (H|aR,wR)
denote the share of wages attributable to workers of type i. Then from (2.8) we have:
Wage Premium : w˜TR,i− H˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share of Cost− Share of Human Capital
= d lnφ
(
H˜,θT
)
/d lnHi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity Elasticity
. (2.9)
Explicitly, d lnφ
(
H˜,θT
)
/d lnHi = H˜θ
T
i /∑z H˜
θT
z −H˜i, so that w˜TR,i = H˜θ
T
i /∑ j H˜
θT
j . Notably,
when labor types are perfectly substitutable (θT = 1), φ
(
H˜,θT
)
is identically 1 so the wage
premium is zero for all types.
2.4 Unit Labor Costs under Pareto Match Quality
The above reasoning shows the relationship between technology and the optimal choice of
worker types. To make this model more concrete, we assume that firm specific match quality
follows a Pareto distribution Ψ(h) ≡ 1− h−k. Here k is the shape parameter and 1 is the
minimum value h can take. Under a Pareto distribution, a sufficient condition for a firm to
optimally hire every type of worker is that
βT ≡ θT + k− kθT > 0.
We now prove this result, stated as
Proposition 1. If βT > 0 then it is optimal for a firm to hire all types of workers.
Proof. Let cTR denote a firm’s unit labor cost when all worker types are hired, and cˇ
T
R the
unit labor cost if a subset of types T ⊂ {1, . . .S} is hired. For the result, we require that
cTR ≤ cˇTR for all T. Considering a firm’s cost minimization problem when T are the only types
available shows with Equation (2.10) that
cˇTR =
[
∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)]θT /βT
](βT /θT)/(1−k)
.
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Considering then that
cTR/cˇ
T
R =
[
1+
(
∑
i/∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i ]θT /βT /∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i ]θT /βT
)](βT /θT)/(1−k)
,
clearly cTR ≤ cˇTR so long as βT/θT (1− k)≤ 0, which holds for βT > 0 since k > 1.
A positive βT is guaranteed by a supermodular labor technology (θT < 1). For submod-
ular production (θT > 1), a positive βT is a requirement that the Pareto shape parameter k
be sufficiently close to 1. This guarantees the tail of the match quality distribution is thick
enough to justify hiring at least a few workers of each type. This induces the isoquants de-
picted in Figure 2.2, which illustrates a more standard trade off between different types of
workers, so long as the coordinates are transformed to the space of hiring standards h.
Figure 2.2: Submodular Production in h Space
The general cost function derived implies the unit labor cost of L in region R is
Unit Labor Cost Problem : cTR ≡minH CT (H|aR,wR) subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
From Equations (2.5) and (2.9) the unit labor cost function may be solved as
Unit Labor Costs : cTR =
[
∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)]θT /βT
](βT /θT)/(1−k)
. (2.10)
Notably, the number of times a firm goes to hire workers, N, can be solved as N = 1/ f k.
Thus, N is decreasing in both the cost of hiring and k, as increases in k imply a thinner right
tail of match quality, so that repeatedly screening workers has lower returns. Finally, w˜TR,i,
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the share of wages attributable to workers of type i becomes
w˜TR,i =
(
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i )θT /βT /∑
j
(
aR, j
(
mTj
) kw1−kR, j )θT /βT
Equation (2.10) summarizes the cost of one unit of labor L in terms of the Pareto shape
parameter k, the technology θT and regional characteristics aR and wR. Such differences
in regional unit labor costs translate directly into measured productivity differences across
firms. In order to solve for total unit costs (which include non-labor costs), we assume each
production function FTj is defined by the following Cobb-Douglas form:
FTj (M,K,L) = η
−1
j ·Mα
T
M Kα
T
K Lα
T
L . (2.11)
Here η j is a Hicks neutral cost shifter which varies across firms, and we assume constant
returns to scale. It is then straightforward to derive total unit costs from (2.7) and (2.10) as
Total Unit Costs : uTR j = u
T
Rη j =
(
rTM/α
T
M
)αTM (rTK/αTK)αTK (cTR/αTL )αTL ·η j, (2.12)
where uTR represents the regional component of unit costs not idiosyncratic to firms.
Section 4 presents a two stage OLS procedure which can recover the differences in unit
labor costs cTR (aR,wR)/c
T
R′ (aR′,wR′) between any two regions R and R
′, but first we resolve
firm behavior in general equilibrium.
3 Firm Production under Monopolistic Competition
This section combines the insights into firm behavior just developed into a general equilib-
rium model of monopolistic competition. Firms, who are ex ante identical, choose among
regions to locate. Key to a firm’s location decision are the expected profits of entry. These
profits depend on 1) the distribution of worker types and wages and 2) the competition
present from other firms who enter the region. We determine equilibrium production and
location choices conditional on wages, which relates regional costs to firm density. We also
show an equilibrium wage vector exists which supports these choices by firms.
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3.1 Model Setting
Each region R is endowed with a population PR of workers composed of S types. We take
the well known approach of Melitz (2003) to model firms who face fixed entry costs Fe,
receive a random cost draw η j ∼ G and face a fixed production cost fe.11 Akin to Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2007), firms combine different types of inputs to produce. Distinct
from both these models, firms ex ante may freely enter any region R which will determine
the cost structure they face. Each firm j produces a distinct variety, and in equilibrium a
mass of firmsMTR enter and entrants with cost draws less than a prohibitively high cost level
ηTR produce. MTR and η
T
R together determine the set of varieties available to consumers.
3.2 Aggregate Income, Demand and Budget Shares
Consumption is determined by the aggregate level of income IAgg, and since labor is supplied
inelastically, this is necessarily
IAgg =∑
R
∑
i
wR,iaR,iPR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Wages of Type i in R
+∑
T
rTMM
T + rTKK
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non−labor Income
. (3.1)
Consumer preferences over varieties j and quantities
{
QTR j
}
take the Dixit-Stiglitz form
UTR ≡U
(
MTR ,ηTR ,QTR
)
=MTR
∫ ηTR
0
(
QTR j
)ρ
dG( j)
in each region and industry, with total utility U (M,η ,Q) ≡ ΠTΠR
(
UTR
)σTR , where σTR are
relative weights put on final goods normalized so that ∑T,RσTR = 1.
Firms are the sole sellers of their variety, and thus are monopolists who provide their
variety at a price PTR j. Consumers, in turn, face a vector of prices
{
PTR j
}
, and a particular
consumer with income I has the following demand curve for each variety:
QTR j = I ·
(
PTR jU
T
R /σ
T
R
) 1
ρ−1 /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
) 1
ρ−1 Mtr
∫ η tr
0
((
Ptr,z
)ρ U tr) 1ρ−1 dG(z) . (3.2)
Clearly, even if consumers have different incomes, aggregate demand for variety j corre-
sponds to that of a representative consumer with income equal to aggregate income, IAgg.
11G is assumed to be absolutely continuous with finite mean.
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After paying an entry cost of Fe output units, firms know their cost draw, which paired
with regional input markets determine their total unit cost uTR j. Firms maximize profits
piTR j
(
PTR j
)
=
(
PTR j−uTR j
)
QTR j−uTR fe
by choosing an optimal price PTR j = u
T
R j/ρ , resulting in a markup of 1/ρ over costs. Firms
who cannot make a positive profit do not produce to avoid paying the fixed cost of fe output
units. Since profits decrease in costs, there is a unique cutoff cost draw ηTR which implies
zero profits, while firms with η j < ηTR produce. As there are no barriers to entry besides the
entry cost Fe, firms enter in every region until expected profits are zero. This yields the
Spatial Zero Profit Condition : E
[
piTR j
]
= Fe, ∀R,T.
The expressions which fix the cutoff cost draw ηTR and mass of entry MTR can be neatly
summarized by defining the mass of entrants who produce, M˜TR , and the (locally weighted)
average cost draw in each region, η˜TR :
M˜TR ≡MTRG
(
ηTR
)
, η˜TR ≡
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTRzu
T
R
(
UTR
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
.
It is shown in the Appendix that ηTR depends only on fe, Fe, and G, so there is a unique cutoff
cost η = ηTR across all regions and industries. The appendix also shows that the free entry
and zero profit conditions imply that the share of income spent on goods from each region
and technology pair (R,T ) is given by
Consumer Budget Share for R,T : MTRuTR/∑
t,r
Mtrutt = σTR /∑
t,r
σ tr = σ
T
R .
Having determined firm behavior in the product market, we now examine input markets.
3.3 Regional Factor Market Clearing
The only remaining equilibrium conditions are that input prices guarantee firm input demand
exhausts material and capital stocks, in addition to each regional pool of workers. A final
assumption on the budget shares
{
σTR
}
ensures that two regions which have identical skill
distributions have the same wage schedule. Within an industry, each σTR is proportional to
PR, so that σTR = σTPR for some σT . Since production is Cobb-Douglas, the share of total
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costs (equal to IAgg) which go to each factor is the factor output elasticity, so full resource
utilization of materials and capital requires
MT = αTMσ
T IAggP/rTM, KT = αTKσT IAggP/rTK. (3.3)
where P ≡ ∑RPR is the total population. These two equations capture the allocation of
technology specific resources across regions.
In contrast, labor is immobile outside of a region, and effective labor of LTR is produced
by each technology in each region. Since the wage bill LTRc
T
R must receive a share αTL of total
revenues,
Aggregate Labor Demand : LTR = α
T
L σ
T IAggPR/cTR . (3.4)
Embedded in each LTR is the set of workers hired by firms attendant to regional market con-
ditions. The number of workers of type i employed with technology T in region R is labeled
eTR,i. The Pareto match assumption and firm hiring conditions imply e
T
R,i takes the form
12
eTR,i = a
θT /βT
R,i
(
mTi
) kθT /βT w−k/βTR,i LTR (cTR)k/βT ( f (k−1))−θT /βT . (3.5)
The total demand for employees of each type in a region R, ∑T eTR,i, must equal the supply of
aR,iPR, yielding the regional resource clearing conditions. Wages are determined by
aR,i =∑
T
eTR,i/PR = w−1R,i∑
t
σ tα tLw˜
t
R,iIAgg, ∀R, i. (3.6)
Equation (3.6) affords a interpretation of equilibrium wages. A type i’s contribution to mean
wages, aR,iwR,i, is an average of the income spent on labor in an industry, times the wages
attributable to each type:
aR,iwR,i =∑
t
σ t︸︷︷︸
Industry Share Per Capita
· α tL︸︷︷︸
Labor Share
· w˜tR,i︸︷︷︸
Type Share
·IAgg
Solving Equation (3.6) requires finding a wage for each worker type in each region that
fully employs all workers. Accordingly, showing that an equilibrium wage vector exists is
slightly tricky. In order to do so, first note that the resource clearing conditions determine
wages, provided an exogenous vector of unit labor costs
{
cTR
}
, as proved in the Appendix:
12See Supplemental Appendix.
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Lemma. There is a wage functionW that uniquely solves (3.6) given unit labor costs.
Of course, unit labor costs are not exogenous as in the Lemma, but rather depend on
endogenous wages {wR,i}. However, the lemma does show that the following mapping:
{wR,i} 7→
Equation 2.10
{
cTR ({wR,i})
} 7→
Lemma
W
({
cTR ({wR,i})
})
,
which starts at one wage vector {wR,i} and ends at another wage vector W is well defined.
This mapping is shown in the Appendix to have a fixed point, which yields13
Proposition 2. An equilibrium wage vector exists which clears each regional labor market.
3.4 Relative Concentration of Firms
Of course, differences in input costs will influence the relative concentration of firms across
regions. Since regions may vary substantially in population size P, the most relevant metric
is the number of firms per capita in a region, M˜TR/PR. The number of firms per capita vary
by both regional costs and the budget shares spent on goods from each industry. The impact
of different regional costs can be clearly seen by fixing an industry T and considering the
ratio of firms per capita in region R versus R′ as in Equation (3.7):
Firms per Capita, R to R′ :
(
M˜TR/PR
)
/
(
M˜TR′/PR′
)
= uTR′/u
T
R =
(
cTR′/c
T
R
)αTL (3.7)
Equation (3.7) shows that areas with lower unit labor costs have more firms per capita. Ad-
ditionally, the larger the share of labor in production, αTL , the more important are differences
between regions. This relationship is summarized as
Proposition 3. Within an industry, regions with lower labor costs have more firms per capita.
The next section lays out a strategy to structurally estimate model parameters.
4 Estimation Strategy
This section lays out a simple two stage estimator to recover the underlying structural model
parameters above. The estimator involves two regressions, with an intervening computation
13Factor price equalization does not generally hold across labor types since trade in goods is not a substitute
for trade in factors. See the Appendix for some limited ways in which equalization does hold.
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which can be done easily in most statistical software. The first stage equation determines firm
labor demand, and unlike many approaches is based on the firm-level shares of workers hired
across regions, rather than wages. The second stage equation uses regional unit labor costs
fixed by the model and first stage to estimate the remaining parameters of the production
function. To illustrate feasibility, we simulate a data set consistent with the firm production
problem above and show our estimation method recovers model primitives accurately.
4.1 First Stage Estimation
The employment expression (3.5) determines the share of each type of workers hired in each
region R and industry T . Since this does not vary by firm for fixed R and T , it follows that
the share of workers of type i hired by firm j in R and T , sTR,i j, satisfies
lnsTR,i j =−
k
βT
lnwR,i+
θT
βT
lnaR,i+
θT
βT
k lnmTi +
θT
βT
ln
(
c˜TR
)k
f (k−1) + εi j, (4.1)
where εi j denotes a firm-type level error term and c˜TR denotes the unit labor cost function
at wages
{
wk/(k−1)θ
T
R,i
}
14. To estimate this equation we use a combination of type and re-
gion dummies.15 To further explain how regional variation identifies the model we discuss
equilibrium hiring predicted by Equation (4.1) in Appendix E.2.
In order to control for firm characteristics which might influence hiring patterns across
worker types, mTi is allowed to vary with firm observables labeled Controls j:
mTi j ≡ mTi · exp
{
Controls jγTi
}
, (4.2)
where γTi is a type-industry specific estimate of characteristics which might influence the
value of each worker type in an industry. The inclusion of Controls j makes type specific
human capital vary by firm, and accordingly we denote unit labor costs as cTR j. We now
discuss how the first stage estimates are used to estimate production function parameters in
a second stage.
14Formally c˜TR ≡minH CT
(
H|aR,
{
w−k/θ
T (1−k)
R,i
})
subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
15We suggest the convention of creating of type and region fixed effects, omitting the highest type fixed
effect. The remaining type coefficients then correspond to the estimates of
(
θT/βT
)
k lnmTi /m
T
S .
17
4.2 Second Stage Estimation
From above we can estimate θT ,k,
{
mTi /m
T
S
}
,
{
γTi
}
and therefore can estimate regional
differences in unit labor cost functions, ∆ lncTR ≡ E
[
lncTR j|R,T,Controls j
]
−E
[
lncTR j|T
]
.
From above, revenues PTR jQ
T
R j for a firm j satisfy
lnPTR jQ
T
R j = α
T
M lnM j +α
T
K lnK j +α
T
L lnL j− lnρη j. (4.3)
As firm expenditure on labor L ·cTR j equals the share αTL of revenues PTR jQTR j, we have L jcTR j =
αTL PTR jQTR j and taking differences with the population mean gives
∆ lnL j = ∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j−∆ lncTR j. (4.4)
Taking differences of Equation (4.3) with the population mean and using (4.4) yields
∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j = α
T
M∆ lnM j +α
T
K∆ lnK j +α
T
L ∆ lnP
T
R jQ
T
R j−αTL ∆ lncTR j−∆ lnη j.
So reduction gives the estimating equation
∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j =
αTM
1−αTL
∆ lnM j +
αTK
1−αTL
∆ lnK j− α
T
L
1−αTL
∆ lncTR j−
1
1−αTL
∆ lnη j. (4.5)
The entire estimation procedure is now briefly recapped.
4.3 Estimation Procedure Summary
1. Using sTR,i j, the share of workers of type i hired in region R and industry T , estimate
Equation (4.1), using type and region dummies.
2. Recover θ̂T , k̂,
{
m̂Ti /m
T
S
}
and
{
γ̂Ti
}
. Bootstrap standard errors or use the delta
method.
3. Use Equation (2.10) to calculate estimates ∆̂ lncTR j by region and industry using the
regional data {aR}, {wR} and estimated θ̂T , k̂,
{
m̂Ti /m
T
S
}
and
{
γ̂Ti
}
from Step 1.
4. Estimate Equation (4.5) using ∆̂ lncTR j.
This specification is structural, but obviously does not compute every element of the model,
and therefore efficiency of the estimator might suffer. In the Appendix, we both illustrate the
18
estimator and evaluate efficiency loss by simulating firms which obey the production model
specified above and apply these steps. In the simulation, the first stage can explain 99%
of the variation in firm hiring of the full model and the second stage explains 97% of the
variation in firm output, suggesting that the time savings of this specification likely outweigh
any gain in estimation accuracy within the context of the model.
Having laid out both a production model detailing the interaction of firm technologies
with local market conditions and specifying an estimation strategy, we now move on to
applying the method to China using manufacturing and population census data. The next
section discusses this data in detail while the sequel presents our results.
5 Data
This section discusses the data, in particular regional educational attainment and wages.
5.1 Data Overview
Our firm level data comes from the 2004 Survey of Industrial Firms conducted by the Chinese
National Bureau of Statistics. It includes all enterprises with sales over 5 million RMB.
The data includes firm’s ownership, location, industry, financial variables, profit and cash
flow statements. Firms report their number of employees by education level, in addition
to output, value added sales and export value. For detailed summary statistics regarding
these firms and industrial characteristics see Appendix C.3. From the Survey, a subsample
was constructed of manufacturing firms who report positive net fixed assets, material inputs,
output, value added and wages. Firms with fewer than 8 employees were excluded as they
fall in a different legal regime. The final sample includes 141,464 firms in 284 prefectures
and 19 industries at the two digit level.
Firm capital stock is reported fixed capital, less reported depreciation. Worker composi-
tion is measured by the share of workers across education bins. Regional wage distributions
are calculated from the 0.5% sample of the 2005 China Population Census. The census con-
tains information on education level by prefecture of residence, occupation, industry code,
monthly income and weekly hours of work. We restrict the sample to employees age 15 to
65 who report positive wages and hours of work. The regional wage distribution is recov-
ered from the average annual income of employees by education using census data.16 Since
16The census data is highly representative of the firm wage data, as discussed in the Appendix.
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our firm data is from 2004 and our census data is from 2005, one potential concern is any
discrepancy that might be caused by the lag between when these datasets were collected.
Fortunately, the assumption that firm skill mix is stable over time is reasonable based on
existing studies.17
In addition, we use geographic data. One source is GIS data for the year 2005 to locate
firms at the county and prefecture level, available from the China Data Center at the Univer-
sity of Michigan. This also provides sea port locations. This is supplemented by inland port
data from The World Port Index
Since regions in China are quite heterogeneous, the first consideration is to restrict the
data to qualitatively comparable regions. Figure 5.1 illustrates the prefectures of China,
which we take as our definition of a region from the perspective of the model above. Prefec-
tures illustrated by a darker shade in the Figure are excluded from the analysis, as they oper-
ate under substantially different government policies and objectives. These regions typically
have large minority populations or historically distinct conditions, with the majority being
declared autonomous regions. Autonomous regions have their own regulations development
and educational policies (see the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Re-
public of China document cited). We restrict attention to the lighter shaded regions of Figure
5.1, preserving 284 prefectures displaying distinct labor market conditions.
Figure 5.1: Chinese Prefectures
• 33 Provinces, excluding:
– 5 Autonomous
– 1 Non-Autonomous
• 345 Prefectures, excluding:
– 53 Autonomous
– 8 Non-Autonomous
5.2 Regional Variation
Key to our analysis is regional variation in skill distribution and wages. Here we briefly
discuss both. Further discussion may be found in Appendix C. Monthly incomes vary sub-
17Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) find the standard deviation of plant-level education years is very stable
from 1995-2004 in Finland. Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2011) find that a firm-level education diversity
index was roughly constant over a decade in Denmark.
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stantially across China as illustrated in Figure 5.2. This is due to both the composition of
skills (proxied by education) across regions as well as the rates paid to these skills.
Figure 5.2: Average Monthly Income of Employees (2005)
Figure 5.3 contrasts educational distributions of the labor force. Figure 5.3(a) shows
those with a Junior High School education (the mandated level in China), while Figure 5.3(b)
displays those with a Junior College or higher level of attainment. A more detailed break-
down of the distribution of wages and educational attainment is presented in Appendix C.
Figure 5.3: Low and High Educational Attainment Across China (2005)
(a) % Labor Force with ≤ Junior High School (b) % Labor Force with ≥ Junior College
While this study focuses on the differing composition of input markets across China as
they exist in 2004-2005, some brief remarks are in order about the origins of these substan-
tial differences.18 These differences stem from many factors, including the dynamic nature
of China’s rapidly growing economy, targeted economic policies and geographic agglom-
eration of industries across China. Faber (2012) finds that expansion of China’s National
Trunk Highway System displaced economic activity from counties peripheral to the Sys-
tem. Similarly, Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner, and Zhang (2012) show that mass
18We consider regional price variation at a fixed point in time. Reallocation certainly occurs and is very
important in explaining dynamics (e.g. Borjas (2003)) but are outside the scope of this paper.
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transit systems in China have increased the population density in city centers, while radial
highways around cities have dispersed population and industrial activity. An overview of
important Chinese economic policies is also provided by Defever and Riano (2012), who
quantify their impact on firms.
Of particular interest for labor markets are substantial variation in wages and the atten-
dant migration this induces. The extent to which labor market migration has been stymied
by the hukou system of internal passports is not well studied, although its impact has likely
lessened since 2000.19 Given that rural to urban migration typifies the pattern of structural
transformation currently underway in China, we control for rural and urban effects for each
type of worker below. Nonetheless, it remains unclear to what degree the hukou system alters
labor flows under the present system. In particular, high income and highly educated work-
ers can more easily move among urban regions as local governments are likely to approve
their migration applications (Chan, Liu, and Yang, 1999). It therefore seems likely that the
size of labor markets accessible to workers is extremely heterogeneous. Given what little is
known about the actual determinants of migration in China, modeling firm decisions when
faced with dynamically changing input markets is an interesting avenue for further work.
5.3 Worker Types
Our definition of distinct, imperfectly substitutable worker types is based primarily on formal
schooling attained. Census data from 2005 shows that the average years of schooling for
workers in China ranges from 8.5 to 11.8 years across provinces, with sparse postgraduate
education. The most common level of formal education is at the Junior High School level
or below. Reflecting substantial wage differences by gender within that group, we define
Type 1 workers as Junior High School or Below: Female and Type 2 workers as Junior
High School or Below: Male. Explicit differentiation in the role of gender for low skill
labor is especially important in developing countries, where a variety of influences result in
imperfect substitutability across gender.20 Completion of Senior High School defines Type
3 and completion of Junior College or higher education defines Type 4.
Having discussed the data, we now apply the estimation procedure developed above.
19The Hukou system and its reform in the late 1990s are well explained in Chan and Buckingham (2008).
The persistence of such a stratified system has engendered deep set social attitudes which likely affect economic
interactions between Hukou groups, see Afridi, Li, and Ren (2012).
20Bernhofen and Brown (2011) distinguish between skilled male labor, unskilled male labour and female
labour and find that the factor prices across these three types of labor differ substantially.
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6 Estimation Results
This section reports our estimation results, then turns to a discussion of the quantitative
labor cost and productivity differences accounted for by local market conditions in China.
The section continues by testing the firm location implications of the model, finding broad
support that economic activity locates where estimated unit labor costs are lower. Finally,
we compare estimation results of our unit cost based method with one approach common in
the literature, which assumes that labor types are perfectly substitutable.
6.1 Estimates of Market Conditions and Production Technologies
The full first stage regression results for several manufacturing industries in China are pre-
sented in Tables A.7 and A.8 of Appendix D.2. A representative set of estimates for the Gen-
eral Machinery industry are presented in Table 1. The first box in Table 1, labeled Primary
Variables, are consistent with the model. Though values for the coefficients
(
θT/βT
)
lnmi/m4
are not specified by the model, their estimated values do increase in type in Table 1, which
is consonant with formal education increasing worker output.
Table 1: First Stage Results: General Machinery
Primary Variables ln(% Hired) Firm Controls
ln(wR,i) -2.687*** m1 ∗Urban Dummy -1.384***
ln(aR,i) 1.794*** m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.980***
m1 (≤Junior HS: Female) -10.170*** m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.427***
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -6.171*** m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.336***
m3 (Senior High School) -3.180*** m1∗% Foreign Equity -2.448***
m2∗% Foreign Equity -1.864***
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.311***
Regional Controls m4∗% Foreign Equity 3.847***
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou -5.957*** m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.934***
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.072*** m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.403***
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.218*** m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.143***
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -7.026*** m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.351***
Observations: 62,908. R2 : 0.139 Includes Regional Fixed Effects
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
The remaining two boxes include regional controls from the Census and firm level con-
trols from the manufacturing survey. The regional controls are by prefecture, and include
the percentage of each type with a non-agricultural Hukou. The firm level controls include
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the share of foreign equity, the age of the firm, and whether the firm is in an urban area.
Inclusion of controls for average worker age, which control for accumulated skill or vintage
human capital, do not appreciably alter the results. Other controls which did not appreciably
alter the results include State Ownership and the percentage of migrants in a region.
These first stage estimates are interesting in themselves, as the model above allows us to
use these estimates to construct the unit cost function for labor by region. We will quantify
this shortly, but to continue with the example of the General Purpose Machine industry, the
implied dispersion of unit labor costs are depicted in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Geographic Dispersion of Unit Labor Costs: General Machinery
The model primitives of our two stage estimation procedure across industries are summa-
rized in Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap procedure stratified
on industry and region, presented in the Appendix. Table 2 displays the estimated model
primitives, showing a range of significantly different technologies θT and match quality dis-
tributions through k. Table 3 shows the second stage estimation results when the regional
unit labor costs are calculated using regional data and the first stage estimates.
Table 2: Model Primitive Estimates
Industry k θ β Industry k θ β
Beverages 2.12 1.24 0.75 Paper 6.25 0.73 2.48
Electrical Equipment 2.60 1.22 0.65 Plastic 3.51 1.08 0.81
Food Manufacturing 1.59 1.28 0.86 Printing 3.93 1.04 0.89
General Machinery 2.50 1.22 0.68 Radio TV PC & Comm 2.21 1.41 0.51
Iron and Steel 3.21 1.00 1.02 Rubber 1.63 1.15 0.93
Leather & Fur 2.15 0.76 1.24 Specific Machinery 1.63 1.43 0.74
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 2.34 1.43 0.43 Textile 3.73 0.95 1.15
Metal Products 3.20 1.10 0.77 Transport Equipment 1.26 1.38 0.92
Non-ferrous Metal 2.89 1.15 0.72 Wood 1.52 1.62 0.71
Non-metallic Products 2.02 1.25 0.75
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Table 3: Second Stage Estimates
Industry αL αK αM Industry αL αK αM
Beverages 0.13 0.10 0.70 Paper 0.18 0.14 0.53
Electrical Equipment 0.25 0.14 0.47 Plastic 0.27 0.14 0.41
Food Manufacturing 0.14 0.09 0.70 Printing 0.09 0.22 0.55
General Machinery 0.17 0.12 0.60 Radio TV PC & Comm 0.16 0.21 0.43
Iron and Steel 0.40 0.07 0.48 Rubber 0.06 0.13 0.63
Leather & Fur 0.10 0.13 0.59 Specific Machinery 0.10 0.16 0.55
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 0.20 0.16 0.43 Textile 0.12 0.11 0.61
Metal Products 0.24 0.14 0.46 Transport Equipment 0.04 0.15 0.65
Non-ferrous Metal 0.40 0.08 0.43 Wood 0.22 0.10 0.56
Non-metallic Products 0.20 0.07 0.61
While the capital coefficients may seem low, they are not out of line with other estimates
which specifically account for material inputs (e.g. Javorcik (2004)). For the specific case
of China, there are few studies estimating production coefficients.21 The most comparable
study is Fleisher and Wang (2004) who find microeconomic estimates for αK in the range of
.40 to .50 (which does not differentiate between capital and materials) and these estimates
compare favorably with the combined estimates of αK +αM in Table 3.
6.2 Implied Productivity Differences Across Firms
Table 4 quantifies the implied differences in unit labor costs and productivity across regions
implied by Table 2. The cTR column of Table 4 displays the interquartile (75%/25%) unit labor
cost ratios by industry, where unit labor costs have been calculated according to the model.
The uTR column of Table 4 contains the differences in productivity implied by unit labor cost
differences, taking into account second stage production parameter estimates. Specifically,
if firms 1 and 2 face unit labor costs of c1RT and c
2
RT and have the same wage bill W , they will
employ labor of L1 =W/c1RT and L
2 =W/c2RT . Thus if these firms hire the same capital and
material inputs (K,M), then the ratio of their output is
Y 1/Y 2 =
(
Mα
T
M Kα
T
K Lα
T
L
1
)
/
(
Mα
T
M Kα
T
K Lα
T
L
2
)
= (L1/L2)
αTL =
(
c2RT/c
1
RT
)αTL .
For example, contrast two firms in General Machinery at the 25th and 75th unit labor cost
percentile. If both firms have the same wage bill, the labor (L) available to the lower cost
21Though not directly comparable, macroeconomic level estimates include Chow (1993) and Ozyurt (2009)
who find much higher capital coefficients. These studies do not account for materials.
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firm is 1.41 times greater than the higher cost firm. From Table 3 above, the estimated share
of wages in production is αTL = 0.17, so the lower cost firm will produce 1.410.17 = 1.06
times as much output as the higher cost firm, holding all else constant.
Table 4: Intraindustry Unit Labor Cost and Productivity Ratios
cTR u
T
R c
T
R u
T
R
Industry 75/25 75/25 Industry 75/25 75/25
Beverages 1.51 1.06 Paper 1.66 1.07
Electrical Equipment 1.38 1.08 Plastic 1.35 1.09
Food Manufacturing 1.81 1.09 Printing 1.37 1.03
General Machinery 1.41 1.06 Radio TV PC & Comm 1.44 1.06
Iron and Steel 1.34 1.13 Rubber 2.16 1.04
Leather & Fur 1.92 1.04 Specific Machinery 1.99 1.08
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 1.80 1.13 Textile 1.37 1.04
Metal Products 1.33 1.07 Transport Equipment 4.01 1.04
Non-ferrous Metal 1.45 1.17 Wood 1.47 1.10
Non-metallic Products 1.42 1.08
Table 4 indicates that the range of total unit costs faced by firms within the same industry
are indeed substantial, even after explicitly taking into account the technology θT and the
ability to substitute across several types of workers. However, the second stage estimates
indicate these differences are attenuated by substitution into capital and materials. Thus,
while differences in regional markets indicate an interquartile range of 30-80% in unit cost
differences, substitution into other factors reduces this range to between 3-17%. These rather
substantial differences reiterate an important issue raised by Kugler and Verhoogen (2011):
since TFP is often the ‘primary measure of [...] performance’, accounting for local factor
markets might substantially alter estimates of policy effects.
Since firms locate freely, the model predicts that these substantial cost differences drive
economic activity towards more advantageous locations, which we now examine.
6.3 Firm Location
Per capita volumes of economic activity across regions are determined by Equation (3.7),
which states that relatively lower industry labor costs should attract relatively more firms to a
region. Table 7 summarizes estimates of this relationship, controlling for regional distance to
the nearest port (weighted by the share of value added in a region). Whenever the relationship
between value added and labor costs is statistically significant, the relationship is negative,
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in line with the model.22
Table 5: Determinants of Regional (Log) Value Added per Capita
Std 100 km Std Std
Industry ln
(
cTR
)
Err to Port Err Const Err Obs R2
Beverages -0.696b (.274) -0.122 (.200) 18.96a (3.36) 155 .03
Electrical Equipment -0.057 (.403) -1.567a (.259) 11.98b (4.80) 166 .22
Food Manufacturing -0.553b (.229) -0.397b (.179) 15.49a (2.15) 171 .04
General Machinery -0.705c (.400) -1.314a (.340) 19.68a (4.86) 195 .11
Iron and Steel -1.245b (.565) -0.576a (.194) 16.30a (2.22) 160 .06
Leather & Fur -1.255a (.249) -1.028b (.421) 25.81a (3.05) 89 .27
Med, Prec Equip & Clocks -0.267 (.300) -1.135b (.432) 13.13a (3.39) 68 .07
Metal Products -0.236 (.463) -1.239a (.260) 13.24a (4.86) 157 .14
Non-ferrous Metal -1.977a (.544) -0.468c (.275) 27.29a (4.57) 139 .10
Non-metallic Products -0.827a (.290) -0.910a (.155) 20.89a (3.38) 259 .11
Paper -0.911a (.197) -0.320 (.246) 20.04a (2.08) 159 .12
Plastic -0.556 (.352) -1.406a (.221) 16.86a (3.99) 159 .22
Printing 0.103 (.655) -0.123 (.257) 8.54 (7.12) 98 .01
Radio TV PC & Comm -0.212 (.366) -0.741b (.333) 13.92a (4.60) 90 .04
Rubber -0.424c (.219) -0.470 (.398) 14.06a (2.07) 79 .06
Specific Machinery -0.316c (.184) -0.680a (.194) 14.74a (2.28) 167 .07
Textile -0.934a (.273) -1.168a (.153) 19.70a (2.44) 186 .18
Transport Equipment -0.105 (.099) -1.119a (.253) 12.69a (1.30) 168 .10
Wood -2.234a (.338) -1.038a (.267) 47.02a (5.63) 133 .20
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
In contrast to the present setting, most firm models used in production function estima-
tion assume perfect labor substitutability. One implication of perfect substitutability is that,
conditional on wages, the local composition of the workforce is irrelevant for hiring pat-
terns. We have just seen that our approach, which is more sensitive to local factor market
characteristics, helps explain firm location. We now compare out approach with others.
6.4 Comparison with Conventional Labor Measures
The estimates above reflect a procedure using regional variation to recover the unit cost of
labor. Often, such information is not incorporated into production estimation. Instead, the
number of employees or total wage bill are used to capture the effective labor available to
a firm. The estimation results using these labor measures are contrasted with our method
22These results are robust if distance is unweighted, and to the inclusion of Economic Zone status.
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in Table 6. The production coefficients using the total wage bill or total employment are
very similar, reflecting the high correlation of these variables. However, both measures mask
regional differences in factor markets. Once local substitution patterns are taken into account
explicitly, substantial differences emerge.23
Table 6: Second Stage Estimates vs Homogeneous Labor Estimates
Unit Labor Cost Total Wage Bill Total Employment
Industry αL αK αM αL αK αM αL αK αM
Beverages 0.13 0.10 0.70 0.23 0.06 0.71 0.22 0.07 0.73
Electrical Equipment 0.25 0.14 0.47 0.34 0.12 0.47 0.32 0.12 0.51
Food Manufacturing 0.14 0.09 0.70 0.16 0.06 0.73 0.17 0.06 0.75
General Machinery 0.17 0.12 0.60 0.25 0.09 0.61 0.23 0.09 0.64
Iron and Steel 0.40 0.07 0.48 0.25 0.07 0.68 0.29 0.05 0.70
Leather & Fur 0.10 0.13 0.59 0.27 0.09 0.55 0.30 0.09 0.56
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 0.20 0.16 0.43 0.44 0.08 0.38 0.36 0.10 0.44
Metal Products 0.24 0.14 0.46 0.30 0.12 0.48 0.30 0.12 0.51
Non-ferrous Metal 0.40 0.08 0.43 0.17 0.10 0.65 0.22 0.08 0.65
Non-metallic Products 0.20 0.07 0.61 0.20 0.06 0.67 0.18 0.06 0.70
Paper 0.18 0.14 0.53 0.28 0.11 0.52 0.31 0.10 0.54
Plastic 0.27 0.14 0.41 0.31 0.13 0.43 0.32 0.13 0.45
Printing 0.09 0.22 0.55 0.40 0.14 0.44 0.34 0.17 0.49
Radio TV PC & Comm 0.16 0.21 0.43 0.48 0.14 0.35 0.40 0.16 0.41
Rubber 0.06 0.13 0.63 0.31 0.07 0.55 0.32 0.06 0.56
Specific Machinery 0.10 0.16 0.55 0.31 0.10 0.48 0.26 0.11 0.52
Textile 0.12 0.11 0.61 0.29 0.07 0.56 0.29 0.06 0.58
Transport Equipment 0.04 0.15 0.65 0.31 0.09 0.53 0.27 0.09 0.57
Wood 0.22 0.10 0.56 0.23 0.08 0.62 0.26 0.07 0.63
Average 0.18 0.13 0.55 0.29 0.09 0.54 0.28 0.09 0.58
Pushing this comparison further, Table 7 predicts the three year survival rate of firms by
residual firm productivity. The first column shows the results under our unit cost method.
The second and third columns show the results when labor is measured as perfectly sub-
stitutable (either by employment or wages). Note that in all cases, regional and industry
effects are controlled for. The Table illustrates that productivity estimates which account
for regional factor markets are almost twice as important in predicting firm survival as the
other measures. Section D.5 of the Appendix shows that similar results hold when examin-
ing sales growth and propensity to export: productivity under the unit cost approach is more
23The residuals remaining after the second estimation step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm
productivity, are compared across methods in the Appendix.
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important in predicting firm performance, suggesting the other measures conflate the role of
advantageous factor markets with productivity.
Table 7: Explaining Survival with Productivity
Survival Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.019***
(0.003)
Productivity under L =Employment 0.010***
(0.002)
Productivity under L =Wage Bill 0.010***
(0.002)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,409 141,409 141,409
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the importance of local supply characteristics in determining firm input
usage and productivity. To do so, a theory and empirical method are developed to identify
firm input demand across industries and heterogeneous labor markets. The model derives
labor demand as driven by the local distribution of wages and available skills. Firm behavior
in general equilibrium is derived, and determines firm location as a function of regional costs.
This results in estimating equations which can be easily implemented in two steps. The first
step exploits differences in firm hiring patterns across distinct regional factor markets to
recover firm labor demand by type. The second step uses the estimates of the first stage to
introduce local labor costs into production function estimation. Both steps characterize the
impact of local market conditions on firm behavior through recovery of model primitives.
This is of particular interest when explaining the relative productivity or location of firms,
especially in settings where local characteristics are known to be highly dissimilar.
Our empirical strategy combines information from the Chinese manufacturing, popula-
tion census, and geographic data from the mid-2000s. The estimates provide a quantitative
linkage from local market conditions to productivity. The results suggest that team technolo-
gies combined with favorable factor market conditions explain substantial differences in firm
productivity. Other methods which do not model worker substitution or factor markets yield
relatively skewed productivity estimates in China. This supports the thesis that modeling a
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firm’s local environment may yield substantial insights into production patterns. Our results
indicate differences in local markets are quantitatively important.
The importance of local factor markets for understanding firm behavior suggests new
dimensions for policy analysis. For instance, regions with labor markets which generate
lower unit labor costs tend to attract higher levels of firm activity within an industry. As
unit labor costs depend not only on the level of wages, but rather the distribution of wages
and worker types that represent substitution options, this yields a more varied view of how
educational policy or flows of different worker types could impact firms.
This paper also colors the interpretation of heterogeneous productivity at the firm level,
since a component of differences across firms is due to the influence of local supply condi-
tions. Productivity estimates which result from our model are more important in predicting
firm performance than models based on perfectly substitutable worker types. This suggests
that if firm productivity is a measure of ‘competitiveness’ leading to dynamic advantages
such as innovation or exporting, then regional factor markets should be controlled for. Taken
as a whole, our results show that policy changes which influence the composition of regional
labor markets, such as the construction of Special Economic Zones or liberalization of the
Hukou system, will have sizable effects on firm behavior, productivity and location.
Finally, nothing precludes the application of this paper’s approach beyond China, and it
is suitable for analyzing regions which exhibit a high degree of labor market heterogeneity.
As the model affords the interpretation of trade between countries which have high barriers
to immigration but low barriers to capital and input flows, it is also suitable for analyzing
firm behavior across national borders. Further work could leverage or extend the approach
of combining firm, census and geographic data to better understand the role of local factor
markets in hiring, input usage and firm dynamics.
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A Further Model Discussion and Proofs
A.1 Relative Prices and Limited Factor Price Equalization
The formula for unit labor costs shows that regions with different skill distributions, say
region R and R′, typically cannot have both cTR = cTR′ and wR = wR′ . However, factor price
equalization for labor holds in a limited fashion in two ways. First, Equation (3.4) a limited
form of factor price equalization holds within each industry: the industry wage bill per capita
is equalized, formally
cTRL
T
R/PR = cTR′L
T
R′/PR′ for all region pairs
(
R,R′
)
.
Second, since ∑i w˜TR,i = 1, (3.6) implies
Average Wages : ∑
i
aR,iwR,i =∑
t
α tLσ
tIAgg,
i.e. that average wages are constant across regions, despite differences in unit labor costs.
A.2 Existence of Regional Wages to Clear Input Markets
What is required is to exhibit a wage vector {wR,i} that ensures Equation (3.6) holds. Since
all prices are nominal, WLOG we normalize IAgg = 1 in the following.
Lemma. There is a wage function that uniquely solves (3.6) given unit labor costs.
Proof. Formally, we need to exhibitW such that
aR,i =WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})−1
∑
t
α tLσ
t (ctR)k/β t−1
WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})1−k
aR,i (mti)
k
f (k−1)

θ t/β t
∀R, i.
Fix
{
cT
′
R′
}
and define hR,i (x)≡∑t α tLσ t (ctR)k/β
t−1 (x1−kaR,i (mti) k/ f (k−1))θ t/β t , gR,i (x)≡
aR,ix. For the result we require a unique x s.t. gR,i (x) = hR,i (x). gR,i is strictly increasing and
ranges from 0 to ∞, while hR,i (x) is strictly decreasing, and ranges from ∞ to 0, so x exists
and is unique.
Lemma. The function
{
cTR ◦W
({
cTR
})}
, where cTR is the unit cost function of Equation
(2.10), has a fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
and soW
({
ĉTR
})
is a solution to Equation (3.6).
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Proof. We first show that any equilibrium wage vector must lie in a compact set×R,i
[
wR,i,wR,i
]
which contains strictly positive values. From (3.6), w˜TR,i ∈ [0,1] so wR,i≤wR,i≡∑t α tLσ t/aR,i.
Now let
bR ≡mini ∑t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
) k)θ t/β t /∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
) k]θ t/β t aR,i,
and we will show that a lower bound for equilibrium wages is wR ≡
[
bR, . . . , bR
]
for
each R. Consider that forW evaluated at
{
cTR (wR)
}
,
WR,i =∑
t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
) k (WR,i/wR)1−k)θ t/β t /∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
) k]θ t/β t aR,i. (A.1)
Evaluating Equation (A.1), if WR,i ≤ wR then WR,i ≥ wR, and otherwise, WR,i ≥ wR so
{wR} is a lower bound for W
({
cTR (wR)
})
. Since necessarily W
({
cTR (wˆR)
})
= {wˆR}, W
is increasing in
{
cTR
}
, and cTR (wR) is increasing in wR, we have {wˆR} =W
({
cTR (wˆR)
}) ≥
W
({
cTR (wR)
})≥ {wR}. In conclusion, all equilibrium wages must lie in ×R,i [wR,i,wR,i].
Now define a strictly positive, compact domain for
{
cTR
}
, ×R
[
cTR ,c
T
R
]
, by
cTR ≡ inf×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) , c
T
R ≡ sup
×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) .
Now consider the mapping C
({
cTR
}) ≡ {cTR ◦W({cTR})} on ×R [cTR ,cTR], which is contin-
uous on this domain. By above, WR,i
({
cTR
}) ≤ wR,i for each R, i so C({cTR}) ≤ {cTR}.
Also by above, C
({
cTR
}) ≥ {cTR ◦W({cTR (wR)})} ≥ {cTR ({wR})} = {cTR}. Thus C maps
×R
[
cTR ,c
T
R
]
into itself and by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
,
which impliesW
({
ĉTR
})
is an equilibrium wage vector.
B Model Simulation and Estimator Viability
A model simulation was constructed using parameters given in Table A.1. In the simulation,
firms maximize profits conditional on local market conditions, and applying the procedure
above produces Tables A.2a and A.2b. The estimation results are given in the Estimate
column while the model analytical values are reported in the Predicted column. The results
are quite satisfactory, insofar as the estimates are not only consistent but also close to the
predicted values. Figure A.1 further confirms this by plotting the simulated and predicted
differences in the share of workers hired. For ease of comparison across panels, Figure A.1
plots regional frequencies along the horizontal axis and (linearly) normalized wages for each
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worker type. As suggested by the Figure, the adjusted R2 in both cases are quite high: .99
for the first stage and .97 for the second stage.
Table A.1: Simulation details
Variable Description Value
θT Technological parameter. 2
k Pareto shape parameter. 1.5
{mi} Human capital shifters. {4,8,12,16,20}
{wR,i} Regional wages by type. ∼LogNormal µ = (12,24,36,48,60), σ = 1/3.
{aR,i} Regional type frequencies. ∼LogNormal µ = (.4, .3, .15, .1, .05), σ = 1/3,
scaled so that frequencies sum to one.
K, M Firm capital and materials. ∼LogNormal µ = 1, σ = 1.
L Level of L employed by firm. Profit maximizing given K, M and region.
αM,αK ,αL Production Parameters. αM = 1/6, αK = 1/3, αL = 1/2.
Control Misc variable for output. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = 1.
Coeff Exponent on Control. Control Coeff= pi .{
ω j
}
Firm idiosyncratic wage costs. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = .1.
Sample: 200 regions with 20 firms per region, with errors ∼LogNormal(µ = 0, σ = 1/2).
Table A.2: Simulation Results
(a) Simulation First Stage Estimates: Technology and Human Capital
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
{lnaR,i}
(
θT/β T
)
3.912 .0019 4
{lnwR,i}
(−k/β T ) -2.922 .0021 -3
Dummy (Type = 1)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm1/m5) -9.376 .0057 -9.657
Dummy (Type = 2)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm2/m5) -5.295 .0045 -5.498
Dummy (Type = 3)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm3/m5) -2.950 .0031 -3.065
Dummy (Type = 4)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm4/m5) -1.274 .0024 -1.339
(b) Simulation Second State Estimates: Production Parameters
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
lnM αM/(1−αL) .3298 .0079 .3333
lnK αK/(1−αL) .6680 .0080 .6667
lncRT −αL/(1−αL) -.9303 .0748 -1
Control Control Coeff 3.148 .0079 3.141
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Figure A.1: Simulation Fit
C Further Details on Regional Variation In China
C.1 Educational Summary Statistics
Figures A.1a and A.1b reveal more details about regional variation across China. Figure
A.1a illustrates the average years of schooling for the Chinese labor force.
Figure A.1: Chinese Educational Attainment (2005)
(a) Labor Force Schooling (2005) (b) Distribution of Attainment (2005)
UNICEF suggests that the typical Chinese primary school entrance age is 7.24 Compul-
sory education lasts nine years (primary and secondary school) and ends around age sixteen.
Figure A.1b illustrates the distribution of education by classification of (potential) workers.
24Source: childinfo.org
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In the Figure, the Labor Force includes both workers and the unemployed. Workers are those
of age 15 to 65 who work outside the agricultural sector. Employees is the subset of workers
who are not employers, self-employed, or in a family business. Figure A.1b illustrates that
the frequency of each type of worker under each of these definitions of labor. The measures
are quite similar, with the exception that unemployment is more prevalent among the less
skilled.
Table A.3: Educational and Wage Distribution by Province (2005)
Province Fraction of Labor Force by Education Avg Monthly Wage by Education
≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College ≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College
(Female) (Male) HS or Above (Female) (Male) HS or Above
Anhui 0.296 0.485 0.155 0.063 581 862 866 1210
Beijing 0.140 0.284 0.299 0.277 796 1059 1314 2866
Chongqing 0.272 0.408 0.227 0.093 582 820 872 1379
Fujian 0.348 0.453 0.146 0.052 695 942 1103 1855
Gansu 0.216 0.399 0.271 0.114 507 738 869 1135
Guangdong 0.327 0.362 0.231 0.080 748 967 1281 2719
Guizhou 0.292 0.478 0.162 0.069 572 758 925 1189
Hainan 0.328 0.334 0.259 0.080 532 694 894 1527
Hebei 0.230 0.515 0.190 0.066 515 793 832 1233
Heilongjiang 0.217 0.393 0.285 0.104 515 740 797 1096
Henan 0.229 0.428 0.234 0.109 487 675 714 1079
Hubei 0.271 0.384 0.264 0.081 541 757 809 1262
Hunan 0.263 0.444 0.229 0.063 634 828 889 1267
Jiangsu 0.314 0.400 0.210 0.076 758 994 1086 1773
Jiangxi 0.291 0.456 0.196 0.056 525 783 794 1240
Jilin 0.204 0.382 0.307 0.107 522 745 809 1163
Liaoning 0.250 0.410 0.219 0.120 576 822 848 1366
Shaanxi 0.203 0.406 0.277 0.114 497 731 805 1149
Shandong 0.288 0.441 0.203 0.068 602 823 863 1398
Shanghai 0.221 0.321 0.272 0.186 891 1155 1450 3085
Shanxi 0.169 0.520 0.221 0.089 502 872 857 1113
Sichuan 0.277 0.480 0.162 0.081 541 737 829 1477
Tianjin 0.258 0.321 0.285 0.136 995 1019 1074 1617
Yunnan 0.275 0.495 0.160 0.070 504 697 896 1542
Zhejiang 0.357 0.469 0.129 0.045 817 1097 1299 2333
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C.2 Provincial Summary Statistics
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics by Province (2005)
Manufacturing Population Census
Firm Avg # of # Region- Monthly Avg Yrs
Province Count Workers Regions Industries Wage School
Anhui 2,296 208 17 822 832 8.925
Beijing 3,676 145 2 128 1665 11.542
Chongqing 1,574 287 3 184 862 9.606
Fujian 7,534 212 9 504 945 8.170
Gansu 461 274 14 658 805 9.728
Guangdong 21,575 275 21 1269 1137 9.607
Guizhou 812 246 9 464 805 8.565
Hainan 126 149 3 151 830 9.772
Hebei 5,104 231 11 623 781 9.527
Heilongjiang 921 256 13 622 774 10.197
Henan 5,849 228 17 798 720 10.053
Hubei 2,685 247 14 742 789 9.731
Hunan 3,500 195 14 751 843 9.588
Jiangsu 22,197 170 13 756 1013 9.431
Jiangxi 1,501 245 11 556 766 9.208
Jilin 927 274 9 477 796 10.340
Liaoning 5,141 170 14 770 865 10.152
Shaanxi 1,207 368 10 548 787 10.068
Shandong 12,958 216 17 947 825 9.596
Shanghai 9,857 147 2 119 1577 10.569
Shanxi 1,118 386 11 619 847 9.895
Sichuan 3,209 238 21 887 800 9.149
Tianjin 2,671 195 2 128 1119 10.243
Yunnan 733 240 16 695 794 8.675
Zhejiang 27,639 144 11 629 1098 8.201
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C.3 Industrial Summary Statistics
Table A.5 presents the distribution of firms by industry and other descriptive statistics.
Table A.5: Manufacturing Survey Descriptive Statistics (2005)
Share of
# of # of Avg # of White State Foreign
Industry firms Regions workers Female Collar Export Equity Equity
Beverages 2,225 155 219.20 0.281 0.114 0.150 0.107 0.121
Electrical Equipment 12,241 166 201.58 0.289 0.106 0.351 0.030 0.195
Food Manufacturing 3,807 171 193.98 0.321 0.091 0.266 0.060 0.202
General Machinery 15,727 195 152.68 0.205 0.117 0.262 0.047 0.115
Iron and Steel 4,676 160 227.40 0.148 0.088 0.101 0.032 0.056
Leather & Fur 4,852 89 320.70 0.362 0.036 0.682 0.005 0.335
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 2,702 68 214.89 0.296 0.180 0.457 0.063 0.299
Metal Products 10,686 157 146.93 0.233 0.086 0.332 0.028 0.161
Non-ferrous Metal 3,607 139 157.75 0.186 0.093 0.180 0.035 0.093
Non-metallic Products 15,347 259 195.57 0.207 0.090 0.169 0.059 0.088
Paper 5,698 159 151.05 0.269 0.061 0.127 0.026 0.131
Plastic 9,235 159 140.47 0.298 0.065 0.327 0.019 0.235
Printing 3,382 98 133.01 0.303 0.084 0.118 0.150 0.109
Radio TV PC & Comm 6,699 90 402.04 0.342 0.120 0.571 0.038 0.459
Rubber 2,212 79 226.25 0.294 0.067 0.377 0.027 0.218
Specific Machinery 7,816 167 176.76 0.197 0.154 0.244 0.072 0.166
Textile 18,292 186 222.43 0.390 0.044 0.406 0.018 0.168
Transport Equipment 8,632 168 252.01 0.228 0.120 0.240 0.088 0.138
Wood 3,629 133 137.04 0.288 0.050 0.290 0.025 0.137
D Estimates Referenced in Main Text
D.1 Verisimilitude of Census and Firm Wages
One of the main concerns about combining census data with manufacturing data is the repre-
sentativeness of regional labor market conditions in determining actual wages within firms.
It turns out they are remarkably good predictors of a firm’s labor expenses. We construct
a predictor of firm wages based on Census data and test it as follows: First, compute the
average wages per prefecture. Second, make an estimate CensusWage by multiplying each
firm’s distribution of workers by the average wages of each type from the population census.
Third, regress actual firm wages on CensusWage. The results are presented in Table A.6
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of Appendix D.1. Not only is the R2 of this predictor very high for each industry, but the
coefficient on CensusWage is close to one in all cases, showing that one-for-one the census
based averages are excellent at explaining the variation in the wage bill across firms.
Table A.6: Census Wages as a Predictor of Reported Firm Wages
Industry Dependent Variable: ln(Firm Wage)
ln(Census Wage) Std Dev Constant Std Dev Obs R2
Beverages 1.052*** (0.0147) -0.904*** (0.204) 2223 0.85
Electrical Equipment 1.018*** (0.0103) -0.370*** (0.138) 12213 0.86
Food Manufacturing 1.032*** (0.0104) -0.602*** (0.144) 3766 0.83
General Machinery 1.020*** (0.0063) -0.365*** (0.091) 15711 0.84
Iron and Steel 1.049*** (0.0082) -0.777*** (0.116) 4663 0.87
Leather & Fur 0.982*** (0.0112) 0.116 (0.165) 4851 0.87
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 1.018*** (0.0221) -0.332 (0.308) 2689 0.83
Metal Products 1.012*** (0.0094) -0.286** (0.130) 10654 0.83
Non-ferrous Metal 1.054*** (0.0092) -0.833*** (0.127) 3588 0.88
Non-metallic Products 0.981*** (0.0085) 0.16 (0.122) 15329 0.80
Paper 1.012*** (0.0086) -0.335*** (0.120) 5695 0.82
Plastic 1.015*** (0.0129) -0.340** (0.170) 9214 0.85
Printing 1.055*** (0.0135) -0.839*** (0.189) 3377 0.83
Radio TV PC & Comm 1.021*** (0.0172) -0.354 (0.224) 6685 0.86
Rubber 1.000*** (0.0132) -0.133 (0.182) 2195 0.87
Specific Machinery 1.036*** (0.0105) -0.580*** (0.139) 7780 0.83
Textile 0.981*** (0.0060) 0.132 (0.084) 18281 0.86
Transport Equipment 1.050*** (0.0071) -0.755*** (0.099) 8618 0.86
Wood 0.965*** (0.0136) 0.309 (0.197) 3619 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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D.2 First Stage Results By Industry
Table A.7: First Stage Estimates I
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Dependent Variable: ln(%type)
ln(wR,i) -1.808a -2.977a -0.870 -2.687a -2.150a -0.708c -4.517a -3.174a -3.096a
ln(aR,i) 1.673a 1.878a 1.489a 1.794a 1.018a 0.636a 3.358a 1.439a 1.627a
m1 (≤Junior HS: Fem) -8.447a -9.491a -3.186 -10.170a 7.190a -2.052 -13.450a -5.800a -1.189
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -5.947c -7.181a -1.504 -6.171a 12.370a -1.089 -11.160a -2.176c 3.768c
m3 (Senior High School) -2.470 -4.475a 1.123 -3.180a 14.210a -2.058c -4.100b -0.758 6.119a
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou 0.837 -7.619a -2.341b -5.957a -2.373c -4.544a -7.142a -6.038a -4.591a
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou 0.306 -3.272a -1.880 -3.072a -1.355 -2.882c -3.957c -1.805b -0.370
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -1.102 -0.593 -0.837 -3.218a -2.394a -1.606b 0.315 -1.104b -0.903
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.913 -4.572a -0.426 -7.026a 10.130a -8.496a 1.793 -2.491b 3.403
m1 ∗Urban Dummy -0.271 -1.379a -1.462a -1.384a -1.393a -0.0822 -1.032a -1.408a -1.188a
m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.007 -0.991a -1.085a -0.980a -0.585a -0.128 -1.176a -0.533a -0.601a
m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.286c 0.139b 0.175 0.427a 0.503a 0.220c -0.249 0.247a 0.108
m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.212a 1.513a 1.743a 2.336a 3.275a 0.683a 1.053a 2.147a 1.791a
m1∗% Foreign Equity 0.531a 1.030a 0.841a 0.934a 0.751a -0.107 1.952a 0.876a 1.366a
m2∗% Foreign Equity 0.422a 0.678a 0.661a 0.403a 0.354a -0.0680 1.840a 0.335a 0.432a
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.106 0.259a 0.197b 0.143a 0.083 0.257a 0.574a 0.145a 0.093
m4∗% Foreign Equity -0.005 0.232a 0.015 0.351a -0.069 0.249 0.033 -0.150 0.589a
m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -2.803a -0.215 -0.983a -2.448a -2.160a 0.113 0.727b -0.627a -2.156a
m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -2.290a -0.547a -0.494c -1.864a -1.662a -0.190b 0.319 -0.788a -1.838a
m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.714a -0.114 0.016 0.311a 0.862a 0.198 -0.510b 0.417a 0.695a
m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 2.840a 1.621a 2.301a 3.847a 5.656a 3.133a 0.279 3.488a 4.413a
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,900 48,960 15,228 62,908 18,704 19,408 10,808 42,744 14,428
R-squared 0.124 0.117 0.098 0.139 0.168 0.208 0.246 0.124 0.145
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
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Table A.8: First Stage Estimates II
Industry O
th
er
N
on
-m
et
al
lli
c
Pa
pe
r
Pl
as
tic
Pr
in
tin
g
R
ad
io
,T
V,
PC
,C
om
m
R
ub
be
r
Sp
ec
ifi
c
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
Te
xt
ile
Tr
an
sp
or
tE
qu
ip
W
oo
d
Dependent Variable: ln(%type)
ln(wR,i) -1.693a -1.542a -3.324a -3.491a -3.371a -0.854 -1.260a -2.230a -0.372 -1.220b
ln(aR,i) 1.664a 0.332b 1.321a 1.212a 2.785a 1.267a 1.961a 0.830a 1.477a 2.286a
m1 (≤Junior HS: Fem) -7.246a -3.469c -7.881a -5.515b -13.770a -1.997 -10.130a 1.588 -6.326a -10.890a
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -3.128a -0.645 -4.596a -2.913 -11.970a 0.188 -4.811a 2.703b -3.359b -9.086a
m3 (Senior High School) -0.808 0.076 -2.657b -1.849 -7.325a 2.347 -1.515 3.468a -1.290 -6.106b
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou -2.750a -6.210a -6.682a -5.979a -7.176a -5.162a -4.763a -6.271a -5.279a -0.301
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou -1.750a -6.148a -4.710a -4.386a -5.210a -2.819c -4.295a -5.555a -3.153a -0.308
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -2.198a -3.251a -2.685a -1.835b 0.597 -3.361a -1.463a -3.264a -1.039b -2.549a
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.926a -7.690a -7.074a -4.440c -3.291a -2.211 -2.447 -4.025a -3.450b -13.060a
m1 ∗Urban Dummy -1.333a -0.691a -1.057a -1.711a -1.881a -0.819a -1.597a -0.650a -1.130a -1.630a
m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.834a -0.338b -0.590a -1.170a -1.619a -0.603a -1.234a -0.421a -0.714a -0.720a
m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.250a 0.350a 0.272a 0.198 -0.512a -0.035 0.216b 0.285a 0.233a 0.129
m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.570a 2.644a 2.413a 2.251a 0.902a 2.211a 1.924a 2.709a 1.381a 3.331a
m1∗% Foreign Equity 0.834a 0.407a 0.877a 0.193 1.340a 0.620a 1.588a 0.214a 1.023a 0.415a
m2∗% Foreign Equity 0.244a 0.153c 0.361a -0.029 1.072a 0.234c 0.750a 0.202a 0.547a 0.176
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.028 0.039 0.048 0.242a 0.294a 0.002 0.169a 0.137a 0.129a -0.142
m4∗% Foreign Equity -0.310a -0.012 0.000 0.176 -0.160b -0.191 0.097 0.442a 0.168b 0.197
m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -1.016a -1.899a -0.857a -0.247 0.310 -0.576 -1.601a -0.384a -1.266a -0.423
m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -0.768a -0.819a -0.773a -0.402 0.223 -0.242 -1.675a -0.058 -1.171a 0.066
m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.105 0.457a 0.398a -0.023 -0.049 0.319 0.100 0.445a 0.588a -0.468
m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 3.429a 4.850a 3.776a 3.143a 0.321a 2.577a 1.629a 4.391a 2.298a 3.850a
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 61,388 22,792 36,940 13,528 26,796 8,848 31,264 73,168 34,528 14,516
R-squared 0.150 0.164 0.130 0.107 0.188 0.120 0.177 0.221 0.129 0.245
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
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Std Std Std Std Std Std
Industry k Err θ Err β Err αL Err αK Err αM Err
Beverages 2.12 (0.38) 1.24 (0.08) 0.75 (0.08) 0.13 (.05) 0.10 (.007) 0.70 (.04)
Electrical Equipment 2.60 (0.15) 1.22 (0.02) 0.65 (0.03) 0.25 (.01) 0.14 (.001) 0.47 (.00)
Food Manufacturing 1.59 (0.36) 1.28 (0.13) 0.86 (0.10) 0.14 (.08) 0.09 (.009) 0.70 (.06)
General Machinery 2.50 (0.14) 1.22 (0.03) 0.68 (0.03) 0.17 (.02) 0.12 (.003) 0.60 (.01)
Iron and Steel 3.21 (0.56) 1.00 (0.06) 1.02 (0.15) 0.40 (.06) 0.07 (.010) 0.48 (.05)
Leather & Fur 2.15 (0.70) 0.76 (0.14) 1.24 (0.24) 0.10 (.11) 0.13 (.017) 0.59 (.07)
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 2.34 (0.18) 1.43 (0.05) 0.43 (0.03) 0.20 (.01) 0.16 (.003) 0.43 (.01)
Metal Products 3.20 (0.24) 1.10 (0.03) 0.77 (0.05) 0.24 (.01) 0.14 (.001) 0.46 (.00)
Non-ferrous Metal 2.89 (0.38) 1.15 (0.05) 0.72 (0.08) 0.40 (.03) 0.08 (.005) 0.43 (.02)
Non-metallic Products 2.02 (0.16) 1.25 (0.04) 0.75 (0.03) 0.20 (.02) 0.07 (.002) 0.61 (.02)
Paper 6.25 (3.82) 0.73 (0.11) 2.48 (2.08) 0.18 (.36) 0.14 (.026) 0.53 (.28)
Plastic 3.51 (0.29) 1.08 (0.03) 0.81 (0.06) 0.27 (.04) 0.14 (.008) 0.41 (.02)
Printing 3.93 (0.60) 1.04 (0.04) 0.89 (0.12) 0.09 (.06) 0.22 (.014) 0.55 (.03)
Radio TV PC & Comm 2.21 (0.14) 1.41 (0.04) 0.51 (0.03) 0.16 (.01) 0.21 (.003) 0.43 (.01)
Rubber 1.63 (0.61) 1.15 (0.19) 0.93 (0.17) 0.06 (.15) 0.13 (.021) 0.63 (.10)
Specific Machinery 1.63 (0.18) 1.43 (0.07) 0.74 (0.05) 0.10 (.03) 0.16 (.005) 0.55 (.02)
Textile 3.73 (0.36) 0.95 (0.03) 1.15 (0.09) 0.12 (.05) 0.11 (.007) 0.61 (.03)
Transport Equipment 1.26 (0.24) 1.38 (0.13) 0.92 (0.09) 0.04 (.03) 0.15 (.006) 0.65 (.02)
Wood 1.52 (0.22) 1.62 (0.17) 0.71 (0.09) 0.22 (.11) 0.10 (.017) 0.56 (.08)
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D.3 First and Second Stage Models Parameter Estimates
Table A.9: Model Primitive Estimates
D.4 Residual Comparison: Unit Labor Costs vs Substitutable Labor
Of particular interest for work on productivity are the residuals remaining after the second
estimation step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm productivity. Figure A.1
contrasts the results of our method with the result when total employment is used as a mea-
sure of labor. Examining the 45 degree line also plotted in the Figure, a general pattern
emerges: above average firms under the employment measure are slightly less productive
under the unit cost approach, while below average firms are more productive. This sug-
gests that a more detailed analysis of the role of local factor markets may substantially alter
interpretation of differences in firm productivity.
Figure A.1: Productivity: Unit Labor Costs vs Total Employment (General Machinery)
D.5 Firm Performance Characteristics and Productivity
Table A.10: Explaining Growth with Productivity
Sales Growth Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method -0.074**
(0.030)
Productivity under L =Employment -0.052**
(0.021)
Productivity under L =Wage Bill -0.054**
(0.022)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 119,159 119,159 119,159
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
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Table A.11: Explaining Propensity to Export with Productivity
Export Dummy (2005)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.024***
(0.007)
Productivity under L =Employment 0.015***
(0.004)
Productivity under L =Wage Bill 0.017***
(0.004)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,409 141,409 141,409
R-squared 0.202 0.202 0.202
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
E Supplemental Appendix
E.1 Derivation of Region-Techonology Budget Shares
Using the profit maximizing price PTR j and combining Equations (2.12), (3.1) and (3.2) then
yields the equilibrium quantity produced,
QTR j = ρIAgg
(
uTRη j
(
UTR /σ
T
R
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
/uTR j∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (E.1)
Aggregating revenues using Equation (E.1) shows that each consumer’s budget share allo-
cated to region R and industry T is
Consumer Budget Share for R,T :
(
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (E.2)
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Consequently, since free entry implies expected profits must equal expected fixed costs, the
mass of entrantsMTR solves the implicit form25
1−ρ
ρ
IAgg
((
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr
)
=MTRuTR
(
feG
(
ηTR
)
+Fe
)
, (E.3)
while the equilibrium cost cutoffs ηTR solve the zero profit condition26
1−ρ
ρ
IAgg
(
σTR
)1/(1−ρ)(
uTRη
T
R
(
UTR
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
= uTR fe∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (E.4)
Equations (E.3) and (E.4) fix ηTR since combining them shows
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTRz/η
T
R
)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
= 1+Fe/ feG
(
ηTR
)
.
In particular, ηTR does not vary by region or technology. Thus, Equation (E.4) shows that
UTR u
T
R/σ
T
R =
[
(1−ρ) IAgg/ρ fe∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr
]1−ρ
/
(
ηTR
)ρ
. (E.5)
where the RHS does not vary by region or technology. Combining this equation with (3.2)
shows QTR j = Q
T ′
R′ j for all (T,R) and (T
′,R′), so thatMTRuTR/σTR =MT
′
R′u
T ′
R′/σ
T ′
R′ . At the same
time, using Equation (E.5) reduces (E.2) to
Consumer Budget Share for R,T : MTRuTR/∑
t,r
Mtrutt = σTR /∑
t,r
σ tr = σ
T
R .
Since ∑t,rσ tr = 1, each region and industry receive a share σTR of consumer expenditure.
25To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
η˜TR
}
, and
{
ηTR
}
, necessarily MTR ∈ ATR ≡[
0,(1−ρ) IAgg/ρuTRFe
]
. Existence follows from the Brouwer fixed point theorem on the domain ×R,T ATR for
H
({
M˜TR
})
≡ (1−ρ) IAgg
((
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑t,r (σ tr)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr)/ρuTR ( feG(ηTR)+Fe) .
26To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
MT ′R′
}
and
{
UTR
}
, the LHS ranges from 0 to ∞ as ηTR
varies, while the RHS is bounded away from 0 and ∞ when min
{
η˜ trG
(
η tr
)}
> 0. η˜TR G
(
ηTR
)
> 0 follows from
inada type conditions on goods from each T and R.
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E.2 Regional Variation in Input Use
Equation (4.1) specifies the relative shares of each type of worker hired. Since input markets
are competitive, firms and workers take regional labor market characteristics as given. As
characteristics such as wages worker availability and human capital vary, the share of each
labor type hired differs across regions. These differences can be broken up into direct and
indirect effects. Direct effects ignore substitution by holding the unit labor cost c˜RT constant,
while indirect effects measure how regional differences give rise to substitution. The direct
effects are easy to read off of Equation (4.1), showing:
Direct Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i|c˜RT constant =−k/βT < 0, (E.6)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i|c˜RT constant = θT/βT > 0, (E.7)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnmTi
∣∣
c˜RT constant
= kθT/βT > 0. (E.8)
These direct effects have the obvious signs: higher wages (wR,i ↑) discourage hiring a par-
ticular type while greater availability (aR,i ↑) and higher human capital (mT,i ↑) encourage
hiring that type. The indirect effects of substitution through c˜RT are less obvious as seen by
d ln c˜kRT/d lnwR,i =
(
k/θT
)[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT > 0, (E.9)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnaR,i =−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT < 0, (E.10)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnm
T
i =−k
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT < 0. (E.11)
Thus, the indirect effects counteract the direct effects through substitution. To see the total
of the direct and indirect effects, define the Type-Region-Technology coefficients χi,R,T :
χi,R,T ≡ 1−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT .
Investigation shows that each χi,R,T is between zero and one. Combining Equations (E.6-E.8)
and Equations (E.9-E.11) shows that the direct effect dominates since
Total Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i =
[−k/βT ]χi,R,T < 0, (E.12)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i =
[
θT/βT
]
χi,R,T > 0, (E.13)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnmTi =
[
kθT/βT
]
χi,R,T > 0. (E.14)
49
Equations (E.12-E.14) summarize the relationship between regions and labor market
characteristics in a parsimonious way. For small changes in labor market characteristics,
the log share of a type hired in linear in log characteristics with a slope determined by model
parameters and a regional shifter χi,R,T . These (local) isoquants for the share of type i work-
ers hired in region R are depicted in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Local isoquants for Share of Workers Hired
E.3 Regional Variation in Theory: Isoquants
Equations (E.12-E.14) also characterize local isoquants of hiring the same share of a type
across regions. It is immediate that for small changes in market characteristics,
(
∆w, ∆a, ∆m
)
,
the share of a type hired is constant so long as
−(k/θT)∆w/wR,i+∆a/aR,i+ k∆m/mTi = 0.
For instance, firms in regions R and R′ will hire the same fraction of type i workers for small
differences in characteristics (∆w,∆a) so long as
∆w/∆a =
(
θT/k
)
wR,i/aR,i. (E.15)
By itself, an increase in type i wages ∆w would cause firms to hire a lower share of type i
workers as indicated by the direct effect. However, Equation (E.15) shows that firms would
keep the same share of type i workers if the availability ∆a increases concurrently so that
Equation (E.15) holds.
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E.4 Derivation of Unit Labor Costs
Unit labor costs by definition solve
Unit Labor Costs : cTR ≡minH CT (H|aR,wR) subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
Under the parameterization Ψ(h) = 1−h−k, Equations (2.2) become
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi h1−ki ·N. (E.16)
From above, wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = Hθ
T
i /∑ j H
θT
j , and L = 1 =
(
∑ j Hθ
T
j
)1/θT
so
hi = wR,iH
1−θT
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR) . (E.17)
Substitution now yields
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi
(
wR,iH1−θ
T
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR)
)1−k ·N. (E.18)
Further reduction and the definition of βT shows that
Hβ
T
i = H
θT+k−kθT
i = aR,ik/(k−1) ·
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i CT (H|aR,wR)k−1 N. (E.19)
Again using
(
∑ j Hθ
T
j
)1/θT
= 1 then shows
1 =∑
i
[
aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi kw1−kR,i
(
cTR
)k−1
N
]θT /βT
. (E.20)
From the definition of the cost function we have
cTR = N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,ih−ki + f c
T
R
]
=∑
i
wR,i ((k−1)/k)Hi/mTi hi+N f cTR .
Therefore from wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = Hθ
T
i it follows
1 =∑
i
(k−1)/k ·HθTi +N f = (k−1)/k+N f ,
and therefore N = 1/ f k. Now from Equation (E.20) cTR is seen to be Equation (2.10).
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E.5 Derivation of Employment Shares
Combining Equations (E.17), (E.19) and N = 1/ f k shows
hi = a
(1−θT)/βT
R,i
(
mTi
)−θT /βT w1/βTR,i (cTR)−1/βT /( f (k−1))(1−θT)/βT . (E.21)
Let ATR,i be the number of type i workers hired to make L= 1, exclusive of fixed search costs.
By definition, ATR,i = N|L=1 aR,i (1−Ψ(hi)) = aR,ih−ki / f k. Using Equation (E.21),
ATR,i = k
−1 (k−1)aθT /βTR,i
(
mTi
) kθT /βT w−k/βTR,i (cTR)k/βT (k−1)−θT /βT f−1.
Labor is also consumed by the fixed search costs which consist of N|L=1 · f = 1/k labor
units. Therefore, if A˜TR,i denotes the total number of type i workers hired to make L = 1,
necessarily A˜TR,i = A
T
R,i + A˜
T
R,i/k so A˜
T
R,i = k (k−1)−1 ATR,i, and the total number of type i
workers hired in region R using technology T is LTR A˜
T
R,i. The total number of employees in
R, T is ∑i LTR A˜TR,i = LTR
(
cTR
)k/βT (c˜TR)−kθT /βT , where c˜TR denotes the unit labor cost function
at wages
{
wk/(k−1)θ
T
R,i
}
27.
27Formally c˜TR ≡minH CT
(
H|aR,
{
w−k/θ
T (1−k)
R,i
})
subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
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